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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/05/2006 Accident number: 314 
Accident time: 13:00 Accident Date: 07/06/2000 
Where it occurred: Power lines North of 
Rio Ligonha, Nampula 
Province 
Country: Mozambique 
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 09/06/2000 
ID original source: GZ/AVS2001:MZ03 Name of source: HT (field): IND 132 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: M969 AP blast Ground condition: hard 
metal fragments 
pylons and surrounds 
Date record created: 20/02/2004 Date  last modified: 29/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude: 38° 30' 18" E Latitude: 15° 30' 50" S 
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 




The demining NGO involved made available their internal investigation report during 2001. 
The report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
1.   General 
1.1   The electricity power lines north of the Rio Ligonha in Nampula Province were a regular 
target for RENAMO sabotage during the Civil War. As a result, 34 of the high tension towers 
on the section from Mucarre to Murrupula were protected from further attack through the 
laying of a small protective anti personnel minefield around the base of each pylon. These 
mines remain today, and are preventing EDM from carrying out essential repair and 
rehabilitation works. 
1.2  The Niassa Survey/UXO team deployed to begin a third phase of  clearance around the 
base of these towers on 17th April 2000. For task site location, see map copy at Annex A [not 
made available]. At 13:00 on 7th June 2000 the victim accidentally detonated an explosive 
device.  
1.3  The internal accident investigation was conducted over 7/8th June and involved the 
following personnel: Mozambique Country Manager, Mozambique Chief Administrator, 
Mozambique Survey Officer. 
1.4  As well as a detailed scrutiny of the accident site, interviews were conducted with the 
following personnel: Niassa Survey/UXO Team Supervisor, Trainee Supervisor, Niassa 
Survey/UXO Team Medic, Niassa Survey/UXO Team Deminer - victim) 
1.5  Also present on the 8th June was a representative of IND who attended all interviews as 
well as the accident site. 
 
2.   Events leading to the accident 
2.1  The Survey/UXO team began a third phase of clearance of the task on 17th April 2000. 
Each tower is suspected to be protected by up to 45 mines. These were laid in clusters of 8 to 
10 around the base of each of the four legs. For this particular task, where there is the 
possibility of causing further damage, all mines found are moved to a demolition pit located 
away from the towers. By 7th June 2000, 531 M969 Portuguese anti-personnel blast mines 
had been destroyed. 18 of the 34 towers had been cleared with work on-going at another five.  
2.2  Tower 231 is situated 1400m west of the Rio Lalaua. The soil has a high laterite content, 
and so the clearance was being conducted using a combination of detector and excavation 
using an enxada. This is a standard method used by our group in Mozambique. By the 7th 
June 2000, 21 mines had been found around the tower, with work still to be completed on the 
remaining South West leg. 
2.3  On 7th June 2000 the victim completed 5m of clearance which were checked by the 
Team Supervisor. The victim then went on to clear a further 1.3m before indicating that he 
had located a mine. The mine was lying on its side 30cm from the leg of the tower. The Team 
Supervisor examined the mine before tasking the Trainee Supervisor to move the mine to the 
demolition pit, during the 12:50-13:00 break period. At 13:00 the final 50 minute work period 
began. The Team Supervisor observed the victim restarting excavation then began walking 
away from the tower. When the Team Supervisor was 17m away, an unplanned explosion 
occurred. 
 
3. Treatment of the victim and subsequent evacuation 
3.1  On hearing the unplanned explosion, the Team Supervisor (who was only 17m away), 
immediately called by VHF radio for the ambulance and medic to move to tower 230. The 
team supervisor then moved to assist the victim who was on his feet and staggering in the 
cleared area under the tower. The victim was heard asking “where is my enxada, where is my 
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visor? “. The Team Supervisor guided him from the area of the tower to the access road some 
13m away. The Team Supervisor noted during a later interview that the victim was conscious 
and remained quite calm throughout. 
3.2  On hearing the unplanned explosion and subsequent VHF radio message the medic and 
Trainee Supervisor moved towards tower 230 from their positions at the medical point and 
demolition pit respectively. On arrival the medic performed the following actions. 
Confirmed the victim’s level of consciousness and breathing (he was able to talk calmly). 
Cleaned and dressed wounds to both hands. 
Inserted a cannula, set up an IV giving set and began to administer 500ml of Ringers solution. 
Administered 10mg of Nubain (pain relief drug) via the cannula. 
Administered 10ml of Crystapen (liquid antibiotic) via the cannula. 
3.3  At 13:03, the Country Manager and the Chief Administer arrived at the task Control Point 
on a scheduled visit. They were told that an unplanned explosion had taken place by the team 
driver, who subsequently drove 1000m to recover the victim. By 13:10, some 9 minutes after 
the blast, the victim was loaded on a stretcher to the rear of a Land Rover 130 covered pick 
up and left for Nampula Hospital.  At 13:10, the Team Supervisor reported the accident in full 
to headquarters in Nampula . 
3.4  At 13:18 headquarters informed Nampula Hospital, by phone, the details of the accident 
and informed them to expect the casualty. A Hospital Trauma kit was taken to the hospital by 
our Survey Officer who awaited the arrival of the victim. At 15:25, some 2 hours and 24 
minutes after the accident, the victim was handed over to the waiting medical staff at 
Nampula Hospital. He was immediately examined by the duty medic.  At 16:00, he was 
examined by a doctor. At 17:00, he was released from hospital.  
 
4. The accident investigation 
4.1  The internal accident investigation took place over Wednesday and Thursday 7/8th June 
2000. This involved a detailed study of the site, almost immediately after the casualty left for 
the hospital, and on-site interviews and further site visit the following day. The visit on day two 
was also accompanied by a representative from the IND. 
4.2  The study of the accident site revealed that: 
• The nature of the victim’s injuries, the damage to his visor, the physical 
evidence gathered around the seat of the blast and the history of the task all 
indicate that he had inadvertently detonated an M969 anti personnel blast 
mine whilst excavating ground with an enxada (hoe) at the front of his lane at 
pylon 231. 
• Due to the close proximity of the steel leg of the pylon the victim had been 
unable to use his detector to give any pre-indication as to the presence of 
any suspect objects. Therefore he had been excavating using an enxada. 
The ground was very hard and would have required the deminer to apply 
greater than normal pressure in order to make any headway. The damaged 
head of the enxada was  encountered in uncleared ground some 6m from the 
site of the blast. For details, see photos at annex C page C-1 [not made 
available]. 
• The previous mine found was lying on its side at the base of a large spoil 
heap piled at the western edge of the pylon.  The seat of the explosion was 
30/40cm from the position of the previous mine (unusually close even for this 
particular task).  
• The victim had been wearing his protective equipment (vest and visor) correctly. This 
is backed up by the evidence of damage to the outside of both vest and visor and to 
the minor injuries sustained by the deminer.  
 
5. Conclusions in relation to the accident 
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5.1  Based on the evidence gained from interviews, consideration of the accident 
circumstances, and detailed assessment of the site, the following conclusions are drawn: 
• The M969 was struck on the pressure plate causing it to detonate. The mine 
was lying on its side (in a similar manner to the previous mine found) 
probably because it had been washed down the spoil heap by rain water. No 
blame can be attached to the deminer or team. Our SOPs were at all times 
adhered to. 
• The deminer’s injuries were considerably minimised due to the correct 
manner in which he was wearing his protective vest and visor.  
• Having made an assessment of the casualty the team medics applied the 
correct treatment before quickly moving the casualty to the hospital. The 
hospital were correctly notified of a casualty and one of our “hospital bags” 
was made available. 
• A clear accident report was made to Nampula headquarters at 13:10. 
However, this was a full 8 minutes after the explosion had taken place. The 
driver should have made a short initial situation report alerting HQ and all 
other radio traffic that use of the radio should be minimised. 
 
6. Summary actions 
6.1  The underlying causes leading to the accident can be considered to be: 
a) The close proximity of the metal leg of the pylon to the mine discounting the use of a metal 
detector to give any advanced warnings. 
b) The high spoil heap lying adjacent to the pylon which has over time had rain water run off 
which has caused some mines laid on or around it to be displaced. 
6.2  These circumstances draw into question the use of excavation around any towers 
surrounded with unusually high or steep slopes. An alternative method must be found. Since 
the immediate objective is to clear areas around the base of the towers in order to allow EDM 
crews access to make emergency repairs, it is suggested that the spoil heap at tower 231 is 
moved away from the base of the tower using our mechanical mine-clearance capability. The 
spoil can then be marked and cleared at a later date. 
6.3  Since [the demining NGO’s] well proven SOP’ were not by themselves the cause of the 
accident normal demining should continue, though all senior operational staff should be 
notified of the causes.  
Signed: Country Manager Mozambique 
Annexes referenced in the report were not made available. 
The demining NGO were operating in one-man-teams, with the enhanced levels of 
supervision that this entails. They routinely squat or kneel to excavate. The group always 
wears a full-face visor and a short frontal apron when in mined areas. 
An IND report was made available, but could not be copied. The accident code was 
000985/Code 101. The map reference was recorded as:  Lat: 15 deg 30' 50”S Long: 38deg 
30'18”E 
The victim was born on 1st January 1964.  
The report included little detail, referring the reader to the internal accident report above. The 




Victim number: 396 Name: Name removed 
Age: 36 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 3 hours 
Protection issued: Long visor 
Short frontal vest 
Protection used: Long visor; Short 
frontal vest 
 




No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Unavoidable” because it seems that the victim 
was working in accordance with his SOPs at the time of the accident. The secondary cause is 
listed as a “Inadequate equipment” because the methods used and equipment available were 
not appropriate, and the provision of appropriate equipment from detector to ambulance is a 
management responsibility. 
The deminer was obliged to use a full excavation method in hard ground using an enxada.  
The use of some kind of pick-axe or hoe is not unusual when conducting area-excavation. 
The tool is swung in at a low angle and used to shave the face of the excavation in a slow 
advance. This is the second of three accidents involving this demining NGO and an enxada in 
Mozambique. See the accidents on 14th April 1998 and on 7th July 2000.  
 
A photograph of an enxada is shown above.  
The failure of the group’s management to provide an on-site ambulance is surprising. The 
victim was evacuated in a Land Rover and driven over bad roads for two hours and a half 
hours. A full three hours elapsed before he was seen by a doctor. His injuries were very light, 
but had they been heavy the means of evacuation could have been life-threatening. 
The internal investigating team did not acknowledge that the group’s failure to provide a 
dedicated on-site ambulance was a failing. It was “unusual” to the point of being almost 
unique amongst professional groups in Humanitarian Demining. 
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